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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM G. HOLBROOK and 
BE'r11 1 HOLBROOK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
\\'lLLIAM M. HODSON and ROSE B. 
HODSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Appella;nts. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NA'rURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11767 
This was an action for specific performance of a 
eontract for salt> of apartment house and adjoining du-
plex in Salt Lake Cit)·, Utah, based on an earnest money 
rec(•i pt and agreement. 
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DISPOSrr [ON 1 COUR'I1 
'rhe Di::shict Court JieJd ;.;pe('ifi(' pt>rforrnanc(_' not 
appropriate and awardL·cl damages in the form of return 
of earrn 1st rnont'Y dqiosi t d<rn·n J ict,\'lll<'nt from escrow, 
$800.00 per month for one year, value of 1\·asher-dryer, 
attorneys fees and interest. 
NA11URE OF RELJgF t-;OUUH'r ON APPEAL 
Respondents seelrn dismi:ssa] of t11e appeal as not 
tinwl>T filed and a recornputation of damages a"·arded to 
include the period to the date of judgment, or, in tJ1e 
alternative, that tlw jndgment be ::mstained except for 
the foregoing recomputation. 
S'l1ATEl\1ENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Commencing January 1, 1967, Mr. Holbrook at-
tempted to occupy the properties, posted rental signs, 
purchased a washer and dryer for the apartment house, 
and attempted to assist in the collection of rent, but oc-
cupancy of the iiremises ·was refused. (R. 98, 99, 111, 113) 
A complete down payment of $20,000.00 was made and 
"Tas still in (:'Scrow at time of trial and had never been 
tendered hack to the Plaintiffs. (R. 103 and 108) Mr. 
Holbrook discussed his plans for the use of the property 
vvith l\fr. Collins (R. 109), and l\fr. Collins discussed 
these plans with Mr. Hodson. (R. H:i2, 163) Mr. Hodson 
denied that he had a conver:sation ·with Mr. Collins with 
regard to l\Ir. Holbrook's plans to move the duplex and 
build apartments, bnt clicl ::state that he did inquire w11at 
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Holbrook ,,·as going to do with the lJroperty. (R. 148, 
1 +9) He further stated that he didn't require Mr. Hol-
]Jrook to set forth what lie was going to do with the 
property an<l didn't require a breakdown of the subordi-
nation at the time he signed the earnest money receipt, 
though he had read tl1e said <'arnest money receipt be-
l'ore he lia<l sigm•d it. (R. 145, 147) Further, Mrs. Hodson 
statPd that ::\Ir. Collins told her that l\Ir. Holbrook in-
tended to build units on the duplex lot in discussing the 
weaning of subordination with her at the time of her 
signing of the earnest mone:· receipt. (R. 200) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT IS DEFI-
NITE AND CERTAIN AND CONSTITUTES A BIND-
ING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
Even a cursory reading of the Earnest Money Re-
ceipt and Offer to Purchase (Exhibit P-1 and P-14) 
amply supports the trial court's conclusion in his Mem-
orandum Decision: 
"That the contract ... was not too indefinite 
but to the Court is absolutely clear and definite." 
(R. 22) 
rrhat such an Earnest l\loney Receipt and Offer of 
Purchase can constitute a binding contract has been re-
JJeah.l{].J:· recognized by this Court. Bunnell i;s. Bills, 13 
U.2d 83, :3G3 P.2d 597. Also see Johnson vs. Jones, 109 
U. 92, l<i-± P.2d 893 for a di8cu"sion of a "prelirninar)· 
agrel•rnent" for thL· sale of n•al et-ltate -..d1id1 was found 
snfficiently definite to lw enforceable. 
The problem here is not that the Eanmst Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase is indetiuite or ambiguous, 
but, as revealed b_,. a revi(•\r of the entire course of con-
duct of the Defendants after lia,·ing signed said contract, 
is a patent attempt to avoid compliance. Examples of 
such conduct are the refusal to give occupancy of the 
premises to tlw Plaintiff as required hy the agreement 
and the continual submission of counter proposals, such 
as those contained in Exhibit D-7 wherein Defendants 
proposed such things as subordination of the duplex 
only aft<-'.r payment of $15,000.00 on that property, the 
right to approve any of the plans for improvements, and 
the amount of construction mortgage, etc. Further ex-
amples are contained in Exhibit D-9 and the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract and Addendum, Exhibit D-8, where-
in, though the Defendant pays lip service to his willing-
ness to perform the terms of the Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase, he again insists upon additional 
provisions such as, " ... that the will not commit 
any destruction upon the premises and according to the 
Uniform Real contract when the balance is down 
to $100,000.00 we will still have a 'duplex' on the prop-
erty." and "The Hodsons art' willing to subordinate any 
time to a first mortgage at 6%, the proceeds of which 
"-ill be paid over to them on account." (Exhibit D-8 and 
D-9) 
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The attitude is continued to be expres:::;ed in 
Exhibit D-11, the manrn·r in which the removal of the 
duplex and con:::;truction of the apartment building wa:::; 
('.Olllrnenced during the time when the Plaintiffs were 
away on a tri1J and by the failure to ever forthrightly 
inform the Plaintiff, either in pernon or by his agent:::;, 
that he wa:::; re:::;cinding the eontract or the tendering back 
of tlw downpayuu·nt or relea:::;e of the Michigan property. 
(R. 103, 108, 109.) Enlightening in this connection is 
the of Mr. Collin:::;, elicited by the Defendants' 
attorney, covering indication:::; of Defendants' refusal to 
perform. (R. 184, 187) 
A:::; evidence of the w<>ight to be given to Mr. Hod-
son's testimony in this matter and for further light upon 
his coursP of conduct, it is interesting to look in the rec-
ord at the exkn:::;ive testimony on the question of whether 
his initials appear on line 21 of Exmbit P-14. Mr. Hodson 
has categorically denied initialling this deletion, while 
.Jfr. Collins testified that he did so initial. Mrs. Hodson 
testified that she did not see her husband initial it and 
that the initials were not his. (R. 160, 142, 158, 203) 
However, his testimony on this matter, as elicited by his 
counsel at R. 150 is worthy of quoting. 
"Well, when Mr. Collins brought this to our 
place for n:::; to sign, this wasn't crossed out, and 
just before he left, as if he remembered some-
thing, he pieked up the paper, and he :::;ays, 'Oh, 
I forgot something,' and he crossed it out. And 
I :::;an; 'Tell us what von crossed out'?' . ' . 
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And he '\\'(•]], l think it to yom 
advantage that I <'1'088 it out.' 
And I :said, ·What?' l said. 'I noti('ed dO\rn 
li('re 1 agT1:1<·d to p11rclia...;e prieP if it i:s $150,000.00 
'rhat is wltat l ha\'<' hct'n telling mu is the onh· 
thing I am inkre:sted in, that I ·get $150,000.00 
ont of thi:s lJlal'e, and l do11 't think Yon haY<' 
worded thi:s thing l initial 
that'?' 
And he :said, •If you want to.' And he said 
'\Vould yon like to initial anything np here1' 
And I :said I \rnuldn't initial anything. I 
don't Imo\\· what had been cros::-;ed out. And I 
·As long a:s that has been crossed out I won't 
initial this other thing down here either.'" 
In rellll'lllbering that l\Jr. Holbrook i:s a man of 
a11d l:rn:sine:s:s experit>IH.'.t> (H. 1:25), said actions 
in this regard lwcornt· unbelil'veable. Ht> did 
not demand a rdurn of tlH' papers hP had :signed from the 
agent l\lr. Collin:.;, nor did he inform l\lr. Collin:s' em-
plo.v<•rs of their e111ployee ':s unauthorized aet, nor did 
1H· inform the Plaintil'f that tlwre had been nnauthoriz('d 
ehanges in the docmrn·nt lH' had :signed, nor did he ('Wl' 
que:stiou the• elmngt' until t11e time of trial, (-'\'l'Il going so 
far as to include the pro\·i:sions of tlw Earnest l\l01rny 
Receipt and Ofivr to Pnrelia:se with the dektion in the 
add<indnm to the ]n·opo:st>d Uniform Heal Con-
trad, D-8. 
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is that the Defrndants, shortly after signing the Earnest 
Heeeipt and Offer to Purchase, decided not to 
eomply with tJ1p terms th(Teof, hut instead to adopt the 
plans for the ns<> of tlit· pro1wrty originated by l\fr. 
lfolbrnok and, thus, turn the matter to their advantage. 
On the other hand, Plaintiff not only paid the down 
paymPnt and attt>mpted to go into possession, but, as 
concludt>d by the trial court, was ready, willing and able 
to perform hi::; part of the agreement. See 17 AmJur.2d 
Contracts, page 800, in discussing the man-
m·r and sufficiency of tender, it is stated: 
" ... it means only a readiness and willingness 
accompanied with an ability on the part of one 
of the partie::; to do the acts which the agreement 
require::; him to perform, provided the other will 
concurrently do the things which he is required 
by it to do ... " 
POINT II 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED ARE SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE, EXCEPT THAT THE AWARD 
OF PROFITS SHOULD HA VE EXTENDED TO THE 
TIME OF THE JUDGMENT. 
rrhe Plaintiffs were denied ::;pecific performance of 
thP contract because 8ellern, after breaching the agree-
HH·nt by refusing to close the transaction and refusing to 
del ive1· JH>88Pssion to the Buyers, changed the 
lll'Operty h>· moving the dnplex and Precting thereon a 
8 
/, 1wn)ic />e;/r11'!1u111c1, 1 /)(![/<' 
"D<lrnag('S llla:,· iHj mrnnh·d to tl1e 1ila;i1tiH 
\dlPl'(' tlte C'Olll'L in t]H• o[ it:-; diserdioJJ, 
refnses SJH'tifiC' pel'l'orrn<.l!l<'<' L<'('aUS(' oi' tJ1e gn•at 
hardship of tliat l'eli<•f to tlt<' d<>i'<·rnlant ... A 
111wcial eqnit_v for n·li<·f L>· mi award of darnagt•s 
ma.'· ahio he slt<nnt to exist \\·here tlt<• dcJ'<_,ndant 
has acted in('quitalJly i11 tr.' ing to a\·oid a decfl'(' 
of spt•cifie i1erforman<.:e." 
Th<·n· app<·<us to IH littl1.· q11estion tl1at th· Plaintiff 
sufft>red substantial from DPfrndant\ breacJ1. 
Jn addition to losing· tli(' Jll'OjH'rt.\·, his $:20,UOO.OO do\\'11 
pa_'l·ment remained in escrnw until the time of trial and 
tlrns, tog< 1tl1<·r witJ1 tlw }Jrnpert_'I· in \\'hich 1H· 
had agT<''.•d to mortgage, ·was not avaiJalJ!e for other 
\'Pnttnes. TliP gerwrnl rnle in an action for breach of 
C'ontraet i::; tlmt the Plaintiff i::; normally entitled to 
n"COH·r Iii;; darnag<·s in an \\·liid1 will plac<' him 
as n<'<:HJ.,- as possible in th<' smiw po::;iti(ln ]ip \1·011ld hav<· 
o<.:<.:upiPd if De fondant had pe rfornwd his eon tract obli-
ga t: on:-:; and tlies(· cbrnag('S illC'll1<1(• t11e of gain8 ]](' 
n•aso1iahl:, (•.>:]JPtfrd to rnnk(' from the euntract, that is, 
tl1<' lwrwfit ot' Ji,s bargain. '2:2 A111.Iur.'2d, 
and -!:/, pa9es 7'2 tl1rm19l1 75. SPt> also 11 ALB.-3rl 
719, l'cudrJ1· u11d P111'clu1.,1'J': R.. r·ocCi!J ,tor l.1oss uf Profits 
(l!Jlll Co11! <Ji! lJ{!/t!'d /:)(tfe of Use of L(!!id, 1Vha!' f',,11clur 
F ({ i Is u r Ue(11s1 s l () ( 'o 1111',I/. Ht'P al so fl:) A 111J11r., V <"ncl1n 
r11/(l Puj'(){((.,l'r, JHlf/1' 
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''It is universally n·cognized that a vendor 
who wilfnlly, and for of his own, refuses 
to perform his contract for the sale of real estate 
may be held liablP to the vendee for the loss of his 
bargain ... lrrespedive of whether the court 
follows tlH· rule limiting thP liability of the vendor 
where ads in good faith, the vendor is ordi-
narily liablt' to COllllH='rn:>atP the vendPe for loss 
of the bargain ·where the executory contract fails 
becamw the vendor, suhsequently to the execution 
of the contract, disabled himself from performing 
the contract." 
And, fnrthPr, at 55 Am.J ur, Y t>ndor and Purchaser, 
page 957: 
"If a vendor in ddault acts in bad faith, the 
vendee may recover all the damages he, has sus-
tained by reason of the breach." 
It is granted that a general rule of damages between 
YPndor and n 1ndee, where the vendor refuses to convey, 
is the market value of the 1n·o1Jerty at the time of the 
hreach less the contract price to the vendee. However, 
in the instant case, through the willful misconduct of 
tlw Defendant, he ::;o changed the nature of the property 
that an attempt to apply this rule would, for all practical 
JHlrIJO::>es, be impossible; and to allow the Plaintiff to 
n•eover nominal damage::; would not only be unjust 
to thP Plaintiff, bnt 1ronld be permitting the Defendant 
to not only prevent specific performance of his contraet, 
hut also to escape payment of damages because of his 
own wrong and to profit thereby. 22AmJ1tr. 2d Damages, 
page 24: 
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"One w1JOSl' \\T<rngful conduct Jius rendend 
difficult the a;:;certa1rnuent of the> pree :-c· 
suffend by a vlai11tiH is uot e11titl<·d to rornplai11 
that they rannot !iv rneasun·d with t1H• s<llll<-' exart-
ness and lJrt>rision as \\·ot!ld othPn\·ise be lJOssibh·. 
And some rases lia n· further held tlia t when tlw 
... contract }Ji'eak<c>l' has caus<.·d th(• llllt<'rtainh·, 
he will not be al101n•d to com1J1ain that the 
ages cannot be rneasurPd \\·ith exactrn•::-;::-;." 
ln E1;e11 Odd::i, Jue. cs. Xi, h.on, :2'.l L2d 4!1, 709, 
wht>re the iwt valu(' of tht· orv taken was 1wld to be a 
pro1wr rneal:llll"l' of damage . ...; rnther t11a11 to evalnate the 
(•ntire mim· befort> and after wrnugful taki11g of the 
or<-', thi1:> court, at page 52, ::->tates: 
"8peaking generally about damage::-;, the de-
sired objective is to evaluate loss :m±fered b.\· 
the mo::-;t direct, lJractical and accurate method 
that can be employed." 
Again in Brerdo11 /'.'). Dixuu, 20 U.2d G4, 433 P.2d 
;), the court, in disrus::-;ing the rontention that the only 
proper measun• of damages wa8 the diff PrPnee in the 
\·alw· of the land before and aftpr thP de::-;tniction of 
trees, ::-;tatei:;: 
"\Vl' are aware that in ap1Jropriate circu111-
stance8 this method of as8e88ing damages ha::-; been 
approved in nmueron::-; cai:;es. But we do not 
agree that it i:;J10nld lw the sole and exclusive 
method of a8::;ei:;sing damages in all circmn-
stance8. \Vhen property has been damagt>d or 
destroyed by a 1rrongful act, the de8ired objectivt> 
is to ascertain ai:; aecurately as po81:>ible th<:> 
11 
amount of money that will fairly and adequately 
compernmte tlw owner for his loss. Reflection will 
reveal that a rigid adherence in all cases to the 
rul<-> of the ,·alue of th1c• realty before and after 
the injury would not always serve that objective 
... In such a case application of the rule of value 
of the realty before and after the injury would 
rwnalize the owner by giving him less than his 
true damage and confer an unjustified advantage 
on the wrongdoer by permitting him to pay less 
than the actual damage he caused." 
Faced with this problem, it was well within the trial 
court's discretion to arrive at an alternate method of 
computing Plaintiff's damages as he did in this case; 
and the method selected, that of utilizing the "rental 
value" of a portion of the property would appear to be 
a n·asonable alternative and one about which the De-
fendant should have no complaint when compared to the 
granting of specific performance with its great hardship 
on Defendant. 
With regard to Defendant's contention that the 
monthly amount determined the trial court is not 
supported the evidence, suffice it to say that the trial 
eonrt apparently adopted the figures as testified to by 
.Jir. Holbrook (R. 107), though he well might have come 
up with a higher fignre had he totaled the amounts for 
both the apartment and the duplex on the listing agree-
111Pnts (P-2 and P-3) or a lower amount had he accepted 
the figures on Exhibits D-17, 18 and 19. In connection 
,,·ith these latter Pxhibits, it is to note the 
tt·stimony of Mrs. Hodson, wherein she admitted that 
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tlj(se n'cords \V('l'<' not li<'r:· and tl1at sli(' wa:-; nnablt' 
·. xplain th<> rneaning ol' till' i'igltn's or their ,..;ourcc·. (H. 
1!J7) 
Tlii:s court 111 ]<.,'n'11 Ur!ds, l11c. 1,·. Xi< [,,;JJ1, :-;upru, 
state:s: 
"\Ve han• no disagTe<:>ment with the proposi-
tion that the fact-trit•r should not be permitted to 
arbitrarily icrnore COllllJt'knt credible and nncon-• b ' 
tradicted evidenre. Ne\·ertheless, he is not bound 
to slavishly follow the evidence and the figures 
given by any particular witness. \Vithin the limits 
of reason it is his prerogative to place his own 
appraisal npon the evidence which impresses him 
as credible and to draw conclusions therefrom in 
accordance with his mvn best judgment." 
Certainly then, the trial court was ·well within its 
discretion in the method used in determining damages. 
HO"wever, it is contended that, in computing the to·tal 
amount to he m\·arded the Plaintiff for his "loss of bar-
gain,'' the period slwnld have continued to the time of 
the rendition of the trial court's judgment. This would 
appear logical, since up to this time Plaintiff's $20,000.00 
deposit n·maint'd in escro\\' and he was unable to nse 
it or the for other purposes. This 
was necessary since, even though ht> might feel it un-
Lkel\· that a court \\'Oltld award him specific performance 
in view of tht' major diangt>s mad<• by th(-> Defendant on 
tlte prn1H·rt:·, ::-;till the Dde11da11t had IWH'l' notifit>d him 
tb1t the eontracf \\·a::-; l'<'S<.'.illd(->d, released him from his 
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obligations therPunder, or tnHlPn·d a rdt>a::-;e of his do\\·n 
payment in Pscrow. Cornwq11P11tl.\·, it was nec(•::-;sar_'I· that 
Plaintiff maintain hi1wwlf i11 a position to perform the 
(•ontract if eallt>d 11pon to do so; and, tlm::-;, his darnag<'s 
contimwd to tlw tirnl' of the j11dgml•nt. 55 AmJnr. Vc11-
1lor a11d Purchaser, page 959: 
" . . . damage::-; ari::-;ing ::-;ubsequent to action 
brought, or even to thP date of verdict, may be 
taken into consideration when they are tlw natural 
and neces::-;ary result of the act complained of, and 
wlwre they do not themselves constitute a new 
cause of action." 
rrhe award of $1 G0.30 that Plaintiff expended in 
lll"eparation is wpported h.\· the te::-;timony of Mr. Hol-
hrook at R. 111 and is a proper award, a::-; is the award 
of $-140.00, a::-; ::-;pt forth in the trial judge's ernorandmn 
Th·eision, for the washer and dryer placed in the Scars-
dale. As to Defendant'::-; contention ·with regard to the 
m_'l·sterious disappearance of the washer and dryPr, therP 
is no such evidt>nce in the n•cord, tlw self-::;erving hearsa_'I' 
report having been ::-;tricken. 55 AmJur, Vc11dur a11d Pitr-
rlws1·r, page 958: 
"Aliio, where the vendee in good faith is at 
expense for invp::-;tigating the titlP, or for attor-
nPYS fees, or other similar expense, and the con-
of sale fails, due to the fault of the vendor, 
::;uch expenditures of the vPndee may be recovered 
for, in addition to the general damages." 
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POINT III 
THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS 
NOT Tll\IELY FILED. 
This rnatt(•r \\·as original!:· IJ\'fon· this eomt in civil 
Xo. 11;)07, \\·J1erein Dd"<•mlants' origi11al appeal was di.-.:-
misst:•d. rrhe mattPr was again raised by Plaintiffs peti-
tion for an extra-ordinary writ Ko. I 171:) and on Plain-
tiff's motion to disrni;-;s appeal, (·ivil X o. 117()7, both of 
\d1ieh were deniPd \rithout opinion and apparPntly for the 
rPaso11 of prt>maturity, in that the matter C'Ould be and 
\ms raised in Plaintiffs' eross-ap1wal. Consequently, 
ratlwr than go into the· rnatt('r at great 1Pngth in this 
brief, the court is n'qm•sted to ref Pr to and to incorporate 
1u·rein tlw statement of facts rontained in Plaintiff's 
motion to dismiss appeal, civil No. 117G7, together with 
tl1e llH'lllorandurn of antl10rities filed thPrewith. 
Briefly, hmn•v('r, Ddt:•ndant failed to file his motion 
for a new trial within tl1e tillll' allowc"'d, \\·hid1, thus, did 
not t('rrninak tlw nrnning of the time for appeal. Ht•, 
tli\'IPaftt>r, failt>d to notirt• lllJ said motion for a ne\\· 
trial, and thP issm· was raist>d some rnonths later by thl' 
Plaintiffs' motion to strikt> tlw motion for a m··w trial. 
Th·" trial <·ourt d(•Jli<'d tlw 1110tion to strik(•, denied th(' 
motion for a 1w\\· trial, lint did, after the original appeal 
was <lisrniss(·d, grant Defrn<lants' motion for rdief from 
lat(• filing. rJ'lwn·after, tlit' trial ('Ollrt again dPnit•d Dt•-
motion for a rn·\\· trial, and t11is ap1H'al n•stdt-
ed. 
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In \'Jew of the a11thorities prvviously snbmitted to 
this court, it is doubted that the trial court had any 
jurisdiction to grant relid' as was dom• here purportedly 
undl·r l'HCP fiO(h) (1), <·\·•·n though then· is dieta to 
the dfect that s11eh relief could he granted in a 
tase in 111 re Hu11d.1/s Estate :241 P.:2d 4G2. 
llo\\'<,nr, <'V<'ll if the Distriet Court had authority 
and jurisdietion to grant n·lief from late filing, granting 
s11ch reli<'f wherP the onl;.· gronnds are stated as the, 
··111istakP and vxeuseahle llegl(•ct of the clt·rk," which con-
sisted of the cl(•rk not ha\·ing mailed a cop;.· of the judg-
11wnt to tlw DPfrndants until three days after the judg-
!llent \Yas sigm·d and ent(•n•d and tlw "inadvertence and 
1•xcust>ahle neglect of connsel," which, brit>fly stated, 
<·onsisted of being overworked and too busy would be an 
ahusP of thP eonrt's diserf:'tion and would eornpletely 
n111lit\ till' pin·post>s of t]H, rules s1weifying times within 
11·hieh rnotions for new trial and ap1)eals can be tak<:>n. 
H<:>ganllPss of tht> nallll'S givt>n to the nuious mo-
tiom; iiffolvt•d ht>rein, the praetical d'fect of upholding 
th!' lfo:.trict Court's aetion in this matter is to grant to 
tit!' Distrid Co11rt 1mlirnited diseretion to ext<:>nd the 
ti111p \\·ithin which appPals ma;.- lH' filed. If this is to lw 
th<· law, tl1<•n the rules sho11ld lw changt>d to set forth 
<'learl;.- that the trial eourt has eornplete diseretion to 
<·xtPrnl the tinw for ap1wals, both and after thP 
Jl()rmal appl·<.d tiilll' has nu1, a rnost undesiraiJ[p result. 
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l ;l\11\IAH 1 
Defendant:-:;' apprnl sl10nl<l IH' dismiss(·d as not 
Yilt·d, and thus gin· lJl(•aning and dfrtt to tlw rnlPs co\·-
Pring appeals; and Plaintiffs, on their eross appeal, 
::;l10uld be granted additional darnages computed to the 
datt> of the judgment. 
However, if thi:-:; appeal is 110t ::;o <li::m1is::-;Pd, then, 
\\'h(•n viewing tht> e\·id('JlCt' in the light most favorable to 
the prevailing parties, it is dPar there is substantial 
eYidenct> to support tht> Findings aud Conclusions and 
.Judgment of the trial court, t•xcept that the period of 
tinw used in eornputing- t1H· amount of darnagPs to \vhich 
Plaintiffs are entitll'd should have ht•en extt>ndPd to t1H" 
date of judgml'nt; and, with this change, the judgment 
s110uld be npheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for s 
and Respon(e11ts 
707 Boston Building 
8alt LakP 1 Ttah 8-tl ll 
